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A Reexamination of the Tinker Standard:
Freedom of Speech in Public Schools
by JERICO LAVARIAS*
He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from
oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will
reach to himself.
Thomas Paine'
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or




The protections given to individuals that are enshrined in the First
Amendment are at the heart of American democracy. By invoking one's
right to engage in free speech, an individual actively participates in the
marketplace of ideas, and can thereby potentially change social institutions
by influencing peoples' notions on certain topics. The question of whether
homosexuality is a sin has been, especially in the last decade, at the center
of public discourse. According to Romans 1:27, people who practice any
Christian religion would strongly answer in the affirmative to this
question.3 However, we live in modem times where the right to freedom of
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1. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 688 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Romans 1:27 ("And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned
in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in
themselves that, recompense of their error which was met.")(emphasis added).
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speech and enjoyment of civil liberties are arguably at their height. As
such, contrary to religious conclusions many positive viewpoints have
arisen on the practice of homosexuality. In addition, one could argue that
homosexuality has been accepted by the majority of people, or at the very
least is tolerated. For example, in Lawrence v. Texas4 the Supreme Court
invalidated a Texas law prohibiting consensual sexual acts between same
sex adults. Thus the Court altered its jurisprudence with respect to gay
relations. The Court afforded homosexual relations more privacy rights
vis-d-vis federal and state restrictions on such acts. In some countries, such
as the Netherlands and Canada, gay marriage has been a legal right granted
to gay and lesbian citizens. 5 Yet the debate continues. Pursuant to the very
purpose of the First Amendment, to protect and promote debate, every
adult in this country is entitled to his or her own viewpoint on this issue.
Although there is no question to the right afforded to adults to freely
and openly discuss the issue of whether homosexuality is a sin, there is not
a similar consensus as to whether minors should be entitled to engage in
similar debate while in the arena of public schools. Some argue that, once
at school-age, children, like adults, have the intellectual and emotional
capacity to express their ideas on even controversial topics, and therefore
have coextensive rights to freedom of speech. By contrast, others argue
that youth ought to be able to develop in a school environment in which
they can learn and be free from exposure to hate speech or offensive words,
and thus such restrictions against negative views should be upheld in the
public school setting.
Imagine this: A gay American public student goes to school wearing a
T-shirt that reads "GAY PRIDE: BE OUT, BE PROUD, BE GAY."
Conversely, a heterosexual student goes to school the next day and wears a
T-shirt, which reads, "STRAIGHT PRIDE: Homosexuality is
SHAMEFUL." Are both these students entitled to their views? More
importantly, do they have the legal right to display them in the forum of the
American public school? First, notice the difference between these two
statements: One is positive and one is negative. Therefore, should the
positive statement be allowed, whereas the negative and seemingly
derogatory statement be banned from the public school setting? According
to a recent decision by the Ninth Circuit in Harper v. Poway Unified
School District, that is exactly what should happen, students in public
schools can debate the issue, but only in a positive manner.6 In Harper,
4. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575-79 (2003).
5. MSNBC.com, Canada Supreme Court Rules for Gay Marriage, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Dec. 9, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6685653/(last visited Nov. 16, 2006).
6. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171, 1192 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Tyler Chase Harper, wore a homemade T-shirt in response to other
students' speech supporting the "Day of Silence" (a day for gay and lesbian
students to promote the acceptance of homosexual behavior, tolerance, and
related issues through silent protest).7  On the T-shirt he placed the
statements: "I will not accept what God has condemned," and
"Homosexuality is shameful. Romans 1:27." 8 As a result of his T-shirt, his
teacher told him he was in violation of the school dress code, and must
either remove the T-shirt or report directly to the school office. 9 Harper
decided to report to the office where he spoke with the Assistant Principal,
who informed him that his T-shirt was against the dress code because it
was "homemade" and more importantly "inflammatory." '10 Harper again
refused and was suspended from school because the content of his T-shirt
was inflammatory.' 1
Thereafter, Harper filed suit. Among other causes of action, he alleged
that the school infringed his First Amendment right to free speech under
the United States Constitution.1 2 The Ninth Circuit held, over a vigorous
dissent, that school officials are permitted to censor the "negative" side of a
political debate if the views expressed may be considered "demeaning" or
"derogatory."' 3 The court in Harper rested on one of the theories provided
by the seminal decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District14 and held that this viewpoint censorship is justified
because it is speech that infringes upon the rights of other students.
However, the vast majority of cases applying Tinker have focused on the
"substantial disruption" prong, whereas the Harper panel opinion seized on
the often-ignored Tinker language of "invades the rights of others."' 5 Most
courts have particularly ignored this prong of the standard, because of the
ambiguity of what "invades the rights of others" actually extends to. Such
"invades the rights of others" argument held by the court in Harper,
without a more finite explanation or legal limit, allows critics to purport
7. Id. at 1171.
8. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
9. Id. at 1172.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1173.
13. Id.
14. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
15. See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 260, 266 (1988)
(focusing on the material and substantial disruption of articles concerning teen pregnancy
published in the school-sponsored newspaper); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
683 (1986) (focusing on the material and substantial disruption of vulgar and lewd speech during
a school-sponsored debate).
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that by banning Harper's negative and derogatory speech, his rights as a
practicing Christian have also been invaded, with the promotion of a Day
of Silence advocating the acceptance of homosexuality. As Judge
Kozinski's dissenting opinion in Harper points out, it is a dicey business
for schools to favor one side of a matter of great and ongoing religious and
political controversy. 16 Accordingly, the question that arises is whether the
court can ban negative speech while promoting positive speech. The
answer is no, and the court's holding prohibiting Harper's speech because
it "collides with the rights of other students" is erroneous. In fact, the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning strongly conflicts with Tinker-the seminal case
in the interpretation of freedom of speech in public schools. Indeed, one
could make the argument that if the Court in Tinker used the same analysis
in the majority opinion of Harper, school officials would have been
justified in censoring Mary Beth Tinker's armband, which she wore in
protest of the Vietnam War, if other students could have felt demeaned by
her "negative view" of the Vietnam War.
17
Moreover, it is very hard to even make the distinction between
positive and negative speech because it can subjectively vary depending on
one's system of beliefs. Therefore, the object of this paper is to highlight
the problematic nature of the "invades the rights of others" standard
because the question of whether or not an exercise of free speech violates
such a standard would likely turn on a school official's or school district's
particular viewpoint. A student's ability to convey a particular message
would, in other words, depend on whether or not school officials favored or
disfavored the particular message. As such, with respect to students who
want to promote gay rights through invocation of their First Amendment
right to free speech, the court's rule cuts in both ways.
Part .1 details the history and precedent dealing with the freedom of
speech in public schools, and explains why the freedom of speech in the
First Amendment is applied differently in the public school environment.
Part II argues why the Ninth Circuit has misread the Tinker standard, and
accordingly set forth an erroneous precedent that as a result contradicts free
speech and open debate in public schools. Part III of this note provides a
new perspective on the Tinker standard and its application to the freedom
of speech in public schools. Specifically, I propose the adoption of hate
speech codes in the public school setting to promote a positive educational
environment, but at the same time allow debate on contested issues, such as
the question of whether homosexuality should be accepted in America.
16. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1197.
17. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
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I. Freedom of Speech in American Public Schools
The role and purpose of the American public school system were well
described by two historians, who stated: "[P]ublic education must prepare
pupils for citizenship in the Republic ... [I]t must indicate the habits and
manner of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as
indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the
nation."'1 8 Accordingly, the Court has construed the First Amendment as
applied to public schools with certain limitations in order to balance the
freedom of student speech rights with the unique need to maintain a safe,
secure and effective learning environment. They do so in order to receive
what society hopes will be a fair and full education-an education without
which they will almost certainly fail in later life, likely sooner rather than
later. 19
Although school students do not "shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,",20 the Supreme
Court has declared that "the First Amendment rights of students in the
public schools 'are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults
in other settings,' and must be 'applied in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment.' 2Q1  As such, the Court has identified "three
[separate] areas of student speech," each of which is governed by different
Supreme Court precedent: (1) vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive
speech, which is governed by Fraser, (2) school-sponsored speech which,
is governed by Hazelwood, and (3) all other speech, which is governed by
Tinker.22 Here, the court in Harper decided that Harper's free speech claim
need not be considered under Fraser, but instead on the basis of Tinker,
and neither party claimed that Harper's speech was "school-sponsored,"
and thus governed by Hazelwood.23 As such, Tinker is the governing law
in this case.24 In Tinker, while the Vietnam War was raging with full force,
students at Des Moines, Iowa, high schools decided to wear black
18. CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD & MARY RITTER BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 228 (1968). See also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) ("These
perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance
of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists.").
19. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
20. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
21. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (internal citations
omitted).
22. Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992).
23. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1176 n.14, 15 (9th Cir. 2006)
("Because we decide Harper's free speech claim on the basis of Tinker, we need not consider
whether his speech was 'plainly offensive' under Fraser.").
24. Id.
armbands to school one day to protest what they say was an unjust
struggle.25 The school administrators learned of their plan and passed a rule
banning black armbands from the schools and suspending any student
caught wearing one who refused to remove the armband.26 The students,
aware of the schools' regulations, wore the armbands anyway, and as a
result were suspended. 27 The students filed suit and the Court held in their
favor, affirming that a high school student's expression of opposition to the
Vietnam War by wearing a black armband could not be censored by
officials unless it "materially disrupt[ed] classwork or involve[d]
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. 2a
Accordingly, here, Harper's speech should not be censored under the
first prong related to "substantial disruption." If a school cannot bar a
student from wearing an anti-war black armband in the midst of a heated
national controversy over the Vietnam War, it is difficult to see how a
school could bar a student from wearing an anti-gay T-shirt in the midst of
a heated national culture war over homosexuality. While the school had
some vague evidence that there had been past "altercations" over such
messages, and that some students in one class started talking about the T-
shirt instead of doing their class work,29 it is again difficult to see how any
of this rises to the level of reasonably threatening "substantial disruption of
or material interference with school activities" required before such
messages can be banned.
Furthermore, even if examined under the more recent precedent of
Fraser, Harper's speech would not rise to the level of "conduct which
materially and substantially interferes with the educational process...
[that] includ[es] the use of obscene, profane language or gestures. 3° In
Fraser, Matthew Fraser filed a civil rights action after he was disciplined
for language used in nominating speech at a student assembly.3' His
speech included reference to terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit
sexual metaphor.32 Prior to giving the speech Fraser was warned by two of
his teachers that the speech was "'inappropriate and that he probably
should not deliver it,' and that delivery of his speech might have 'severe
25. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 504, 513-14.
29. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1193-95.
30. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986).
31. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 679.
32. Id. at 677-78.
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consequences. '" 33 During Fraser's actual delivery of the speech, "[s]ome
students hooted and yelled; some by gestures graphically simulating the
sexual activities pointedly alluded to" by Fraser's speech.34  "Other
students appeared to be bewildered and embarrassed by the speech. 35 One
teacher even found it necessary the day following the speech to forgo a
portion of the scheduled class lesson and discuss the speech with the
class.3 6 The Court held that the school district acted entirely within its
permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon the student in response to
his offensively lewd and indecent speech, which had no claim to First
Amendment protection.37  Further, the Court held that the school's
disciplinary rule proscribing obscene language and free speech admonitions
of teachers gave adequate warnings to the student that his lewd speech
could subject him to sanctions.
38
In contrast, Harper's speech did not result in a material and substantial
disruption of the educational process. In Harper, there was no evidence
that teachers had to stop lessons to discuss the T-shirt and its ramifications,
or that any students adversely reacted to the words on the T-shirt.
Furthermore, Harper's T-shirt was not displayed at any school-sponsored
event that mandated attendance like the election assembly in Fraser.
Accordingly, Harper's speech does not come under the substantial
disruption prong of Tinker, and at the very most Harper's speech could
only be argued to have caused a "fear" or "apprehension" of disturbance,
which according to Tinker is not enough to overcome the right to freedom
of expression. This leads us to the Ninth Circuit's application of the
"invades the rights of others" prong in Tinker.
II. The Erroneous Interpretation of Tinker's "Invades the
Rights of Others."
In Harper, the Ninth Circuit latched onto the "invasion of the rights of
others" language as authority for allowing school officials to censor any
student speech that may be perceived by other students as demeaning or
derogatory. 39 The court explained that vulgar, lewd, obscene, indecent, and
plainly offensive speech "by definition, may well 'impinge[ ] upon the
rights of other students,' even if the speaker does not directly accost




37. Id. at 685.
38. Id. at 686.
39. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9thCir. 2006).
individual students with his remarks. 4 °  In addition, the court also
provided support from the Tenth Circuit, which held that "the 'display of
the Confederate flag might ... interfere with the rights of other students to
be secure and let alone,' even though there was no indication that any
student was physically accosted with the flag, aside from its general
display."'41
A. Harper Conflicts with Circuit Courts
1. Conflict with the Third Circuit
However, Harper's interpretation of "invades the rights of others"
conflicts with a majority of circuit courts that have interpreted the
precedent in Tinker. The Third Circuit has struck down a public school
district's anti-harassment policy that banned harassment such as derogatory
remarks or jokes, demeaning comments or behaviors, negative name
calling, and degrading behavior.42 Most importantly, in analyzing the
"rights of others" prong of Tinker, the Third Circuit reasoned: "[t]he
precise scope of Tinker's 'interference with the rights of others' language is
unclear; at least one court has opined that it covers only independently
tortuous speech like libel, slander or intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 43 As a result, in determining what speech may infringe upon the
rights of others, the court held that "it is certainly not enough that the
speech is merely offensive to some listener," and, accordingly, a high
school speech policy which prohibited negative, demeaning, and
derogatory speech was unconstitutional. 44 Also, in a later Third Circuit
case, Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Board of Education, the court
held that "[t]he history of racial difficulties in Warren Hills provides a
substantial basis for legitimately fearing disruption from the kind of speech
prohibited by the policy. ' '45 Nonetheless, the court determined that the
policy could be unconstitutional if a "subcategory of disruptive speech had
been singled out simply because the school officials disfavored the views
expressed. 46 In Harper, this is exactly what occurred. There was a history
40. Id. at 1177-78 (quoting Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir.
1992) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969))).
41. Id. at 1178 (quoting West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir.
2000)).
42. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 202-03, 217 (3d Cir. 2001).
43. Id. at 201. See Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280, 289 n.8 (E.D. Pa.
1991).
44. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217.
45. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 262 (3d Cir. 2002).
46. Id. at 268 n.27.
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of disruption between students on the Poway High School campus over the
issue of homosexuality. 47  Moreover, Harper told the school's
administration that the main impetus for his creation and display of the T-
shirt with the offensive hate speech was directed at presenting the other
side of the issue in light of the observance and promotion of the Day of
Silence.48 As such, Sypniewski provides a holding that would ban favoring
positive over a subcategory of negative speech, even in those situations
where substantial disruption may occur between controversial issues, such
as homosexuality and race previously.49
Furthermore, Tinker itself provides support of the Third Circuit
reading of what might "invade the rights of others." In Tinker, the Court
reasoned: "the record fails to yield evidence that the school authorities had
reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would.., impinge
upon the rights of other students. '50  Similarly, here, Harper's T-shirt
would not invade the rights of other students, although it would be highly
offensive to gay students. Accordingly, symbolic speech expressed in a T-
shirt, an armband, or any other piece of clothing or clothing accessory
would not rise to such offense that it would clearly "invade the rights of
others" in the public school setting.
2. Conflict with the Sixth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit ruling also conflicts with the Sixth Circuit's
understanding of the "invades the rights of others" prong. In Castorina ex
rel. Rewt v. Madison County School Board, similar to Harper, speech
written on a T-shirt was at issue, and the Sixth Circuit considered whether
Confederate flag T-shirts worn by two high school students could be
censored if the school allowed students to wear Malcolm X T-shirts. 51 As
in Harper, Castorina dealt with the distinction between positive and
negative speech. However, the court in Castorina held differently, finding
that "even if there has been racial violence that necessitates a ban on
racially divisive symbols, the school does not have the authority to enforce
a viewpoint-specific ban on racially sensitive symbols. 52 Central to the
decision by the Sixth Circuit in Castorina was the fact that the school
district had not banned other clothing that expressed controversial views,
including Iron Crosses, which were often understood as symbols of Hitler
47. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006).
48. Id.
49. Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 268 n.27.
50. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
51. Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 541 (6th Cir. 2001).
52. Id. at 544.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
and the Nazis. 53 "This aspect of the decision is consistent with a number of
later Supreme Court decisions signaling that viewpoint-specific speech
restrictions are an egregious violation of the First Amendment. 54
Comparatively, in Harper, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly applied a
viewpoint-specific ban on religious opinions or symbolic speech that would
be insensitive to homosexuals. Thus, Harper's speech should not be
banned in the public school setting, even though it would be negative and
insensitive to the plight of gays and lesbians in everyday society. In
addition, the viewpoint discrimination found in Harper is even more
egregious because there was no evidence that Harper's speech was so
disruptive that it invaded the rights of others, whereas the observance of the
Day of Silence-which the school did allow-obviously interfered with the
classroom teaching and actually caused disruption. 55
3. Conflict with the Second Circuit
Furthermore, the ruling in Harper also conflicts with the Second
Circuit ruling that struck down a school's ban on a 13-year-old middle
school student's T-shirt depicting President Bush as a drug-abusing drunk
in Guiles v. Marineau.56 The shirt contained images of alcohol and drug
use in contravention of a school policy banning such depictions.57 The
court found that the shirt caused no disruption and concluded Tinker
established a protective standard for student speech under which it cannot
be suppressed based on its content, but only where it is substantially
disruptive. 58 Note the striking difference with the Ninth Circuit's ruling
that Tinker permits censorship of "negative" student speech that is
"demeaning" or "derogatory" even if there is no material disruption. The
Second Circuit ruling strongly disagrees with this holding by reasoning that
allowing a ban of speech solely because it might be offensive or cause
resentment cannot be reconciled with Tinker.59 Such holding in Harper
would overrule Tinker and provide it no real effect because "it could have
been said that the school administrators in Tinker found wearing anti-war
53. Id. at 540.
54. Id. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828
(1995) ("Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be
unconstitutional."); RA. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (striking down a Minnesota
city's hate-speech statute on the basis of impermissible viewpoint discrimination).
55. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006).
56. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 331 (2d Cir. 2006).
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armbands offensive and repugnant to their sense of patriotism.,
60
Moreover, such reasoning provides an overly vague and broad rule of law
with respect to freedom of speech in public schools that would give school
administration great censorship power. As such, public school
administrators could censor much student speech if founded on a rational
basis for exclusion because of its mere offense to any general values other
students may hold.
4. Equal Protection Analysis: Are Homosexuals a Protected Class?
However, we should take note of the Ninth Circuit's explanation of
the specific invasion of rights in the context of Harper's anti-gay speech.
The majority opinion in Harper concluded that "[p]ublic school students
who may be injured by verbal assaults on the basis of a core identifying
characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual orientation, have a right to be
free from such attacks while on school campuses.",61 As Tinker clearly
states, students have the right to "be secure and to be let alone. 62 The
Harper court elaborated that: "[b]eing secure involves not only freedom
from physical assaults but from psychological attacks that cause young
people to question their self-worth and their rightful place in society. 63
Particularly, the court was persuaded by evidence of the negative
ramifications caused by anti-gay harassment in public schools. For
example, one study found among teenage victims of anti-gay
discrimination, seventy-five percent experienced a decline in academic
performance, thirty-nine percent had truancy problems, and twenty-eight
percent dropped out of school.64 Another study confirmed that gay students
had difficulty concentrating in school and feared for their safety as a result
of peer harassment, and that verbal abuse led some gay students to skip
school or to drop out altogether.65 The Harper court reasoned that speech
that attacks high school students on the basis of their sexual orientation is
harmful not only to the students' health and welfare, but also to their
educational performance and their ultimate potential for success in life.66
60. Id. at 328.
61. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006).
62. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
63. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178.
64. Courtney Weiner, Note, Sex Education: Recognizing Anti-Gay Harassment as Sex
Discrimination under Title VII and Title IX, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 189, 225 (2005).
65. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HATRED IN THE HALLWAYS: VIOLENCE AND
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER STUDENTS IN U.S.
SCHOOLS (2001), http://hrw.org/reports/2001/uslgbt/Final-05.htm#P609_91364 (last visited Jan.
6, 2007).
66. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178-79.
Therefore, the court held that there is a "recognizable privacy interest in
avoiding unwanted communication," particularly "when persons are
powerless to avoid it" because minors are subject to mandatory attendance
requirements and school authorities act in loco parentis to protect
children.67
Nevertheless, different types of negative speech, including speech
involving race, gender, and class, may cause psychological harm to
students within the public education system and can lead to student drop
out and failure, hindering their opportunity for a fair and free public
education. So, where is the line drawn with regard to types of
psychological harm necessitating similar protection afforded by the Ninth
Circuit to homosexual students in Harper? Does one need to look at the
history of oppression directed at a class of people? However, even with
such evidence, I do not believe the court would readily order a ban on
negative speech directed at groups, including obese children in public
schools, or student cruelty to their peers based on one's social class.
Accordingly, such expansion by the Ninth Circuit of the "invades the rights
of others" prong in Tinker is overly broad and vague, leaving many
unanswered questions as to who is really afforded higher protection
because of their group associations.
The Tenth Circuit has recognized a higher class of protection for racial
minorities, holding that the "display of the Confederate flag might...
interfere with the rights of other students to be secure and let alone,"
specifically looking to the history of oppression and inferiority directed at
African Americans.68 In Derby, a student ("T.W.") drew the Confederate
flag and was suspended in violation of school policy prohibiting the
drawing of the Confederate flag.69 Previously, the student was suspended
for calling another student "blackie." 7° In early 1995, prior to the adoption
of this policy, several verbal confrontations occurred between black and
white students at Derby High School.7' Some white students wore shirts
bearing the image of the Confederate flag, while some black students wore
shirts with an "X," denoting support for the teachings of Malcolm X.
72
Members of the Aryan Nation and Ku Klux Klan became active off campus
circulating materials to students encouraging racism. 73 Around the same
67. Id. at 1178 (internal quotations omitted).
68. West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000).
69. Id. at 1361.
70. Id. at 1363.
71. Id. at 1366.
72. Id. at 1362.
73. Id.
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time, graffiti stating such things as "KKK" (Ku Klux Klan), "KKKK" (Ku
Klux Klan Killer), and "Die Nigger" appeared on campus in bathrooms and
on walls and sidewalks.74 School officials received reports of racial
incidents on school buses and at football games.75 At least one fight broke
out as a result of a student wearing a Confederate flag headband.76 These
included students drawing the Confederate flag on their notebooks and
arms. 77 In response to the situation, the Derby School District organized a
task force comprised of parents, teachers, and other community members to
propose a course of action for the district. 78 The task force recommended
the adoption of a racial harassment policy to help alleviate the problem.79
The school district subsequently adopted the "Racial Harassment and
Intimidation" policy.80 The policy resulted in a "marked decline of
incidents of racial harassment and discord" in the school district. 81 The
number of referrals in the middle school dealing with racial problems in the
last two years was significantly lower than the number observed in 1996.,,82
Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that the school district's legitimate interest
was clearly "to prevent potentially disruptive student conduct from
interfering with the educational process. 83 The court concluded that the
school district's harassment and intimidation policy did not violate T.W.'s
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 84 Further, the
court concluded that the Derby School District did not violate T.W.'s First
Amendment right to free speech when it suspended him from school for
three days after he drew a picture of the Confederate flag during class in
violation of the school district's harassment and intimidation policy.
85
Again, while students do not "shed the constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the First Amendment rights of students in public schools
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other








81. West, 206 F.3d at 1362.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1365.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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with its basic educational mission even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside the school. 86
In comparison to Harper, there are three key distinctions in Derby.
First, Derby deals with speech that resulted from violation of a policy
implemented to combat years of deeply penetrating racial tensions between
black and white students in the Derby public school system. Although
Harper's speech was also in violation of school code, it was not in violation
of school policy because of numerous incidents of harassment and
altercations between heterosexual and homosexual students. In fact, there
were only two minor incidents that show a dispute on the issue of
homosexuality at Poway High School. Secondly, the court, in holding for
the school district, focused on the substantial and material disruption prong
in Tinker and in light of substantial evidence that drawing the confederate
flag would elicit heated racial tensions and discord in the Derby schools.
Comparatively, such disruption was not apparent to result at Poway High
School. Lastly and most importantly, the cases can be distinguished by the
respective groups protected from negative speech in the public school
setting. In Derby, the speech centered on racism directed at African-
American students. On the other hand, the speech in Harper attacked
homosexuals on the basis of their sexual orientation.
Accordingly, the major difference is the protection of different classes
of people-race vis-A-vis gender; a suspect class vis-A-vis a non-suspect
class of people. As such, one can make the argument that because race and
racism in the American courts has been treated with more importance and
heightened scrutiny than the rights of sexual minorities, the Ninth Circuit's
goal to protect the rights of homosexuals from psychological harm against
negative speech would not pass muster against the legitimate governmental
interest in protecting the fundamental right to express negative viewpoints
on homosexuality in public schools.
Therefore, the real question is whether the interest of protecting gay
and lesbian adolescents from harassment clearly outweighs the
fundamental First Amendment right to free speech for students who desire
to openly express their viewpoints against homosexuality in the public
school setting. To answer this question, one can examine the standard of
review applied by the Supreme Court in equal protection cases assessing
the rights of minorities, specifically those dealing with race, and cases
dealing with sexual orientation, the right to homosexual sex, and same-sex
marriage. A key question in equal protection cases is what level of scrutiny
the case should be examined under. The most frequent debate in cases
86. Id. at 1365-66 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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dealing with sexual orientation is whether discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is deserving of strict scrutiny-the highest level of
scrutiny in American courts. Strict scrutiny is reserved for statutes or state
constitutional amendments that discriminate against members of
traditionally suspect classes 7 or infringe on any fundamental constitutional
right.8 Laws that are subject to strict scrutiny will be sustained only if they
are supported by a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve
that interest in the least restrictive manner possible. 89 Because factors such
as race, alienage, or national origin are so seldom relevant to the
achievement of any legitimate state interest, laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy. However, in
most cases dealing with sexual orientation discrimination, the Supreme
Court has concluded that rational basis review is the standard of review that
should be applied and not heightened scrutiny. For example, in Romer v.
Evans, the citizens of the state of Colorado voted to implement
"Amendment 2" to the state constitution. 90  The ultimate effect of
Amendment 2 was to prohibit any governmental entity from adopting
similar, or more protective statutes, regulations, ordinances, or policies to
protect persons from discrimination based on sexual orientation in the
future unless the state constitution is first amended to permit such
measures. 91  The Court argued that the amendment withdrew from
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from injuries caused
by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies.92
The Court held Amendment 2 to the Colorado state constitution as
unconstitutional because it did not classify homosexuals to further a proper
legislative end, but to make them unequal to everyone else. 93 Further, the
Court declared that a state cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to
its laws and as such, Amendment 2 was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.94
More important, however, is the standard of review applied by the
Court. Before reaching the Supreme Court, the Colorado Supreme Court
87. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(national ancestry and ethnic origin).
88. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
89. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982).
90. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
91. Id. at 624.
92. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627.
93. Id. at 635.
94. Id.
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applied strict scrutiny, arguing that amendment was subject to strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
infringing upon the "fundamental right" of homosexuals to participate in
the political process. 95 However, the Supreme Court did not agree and only
applied rational basis review: A legislative classification must be sustained
if the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest.96 The Court stated that if a law neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a suspect class, it will uphold the legislative classification
so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.97
Accordingly, by the Court's use of rational basis review, it concluded that
Romer did not involve a fundamental right or a suspect class deemed
worthy of strict scrutiny. 98 Furthermore, rational basis review is also the
standard that has been applied in same-sex marriage cases. In Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health, several Massachusetts couples challenged the
state's restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples as a violation of
various provisions of the state constitution.99 In its opinion, the Supreme
Judicial Court concluded that Massachusetts' restriction of marriage to
opposite-sex couples did not satisfy rationality review and rejected the
state's argument that the prohibition on same-sex marriage reflected a
permissible judgment that marriage was fundamentally concerned with
procreation. 00 The court noted that opposite-sex couples who either did
not intend to or were unable to procreate were entitled nonetheless to get
married. 1 1 However, in both Goodridge and Romer, each court only
applied the minimum rational basis review to these equal protection claims.
There is the plausible argument that because gays and lesbians have long
been a target of hatred and discrimination, strict scrutiny is justified in
sexual orientation cases. Nonetheless, many opponents of a heightened
level of review in sexual orientation cases note that homosexuals are an
economically advantaged group in society. 102 They further point out that
homosexuals are an affluent and highly educated class, politically
powerful, and more likely to vote. Also, the Human Rights Campaign is
95. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Colo. 1993).
96. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. at 632-33.
97. Id. at 631.
98. Id.
99. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 314 (Mass. 2003).
100. Id. at 961.
101. Id.
102. Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation,
Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 393, 407-08 (1994).
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one of the fastest-growing political action organizations in Washington.,
0 3
As such, the conclusion can be made that gay rights have not yet been
recognized to rise to the level of "fundamental rights," and being a gay man
or woman in America does not place one in a "suspect class" affording the
highest level of scrutiny in terms of Equal Protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. For that matter, the protection of gay youth in public schools
is not as high as the protection of black and female children. Thus, the
argument made by the Ninth Circuit in protecting children in public schools
and affording them a blanket ban on any negative speech directed at their
sexual orientation because of the history of oppression is weak.
Particularly, because the freedom of speech and to religious exercise are
both "fundamental rights," a ban on any negative speech, such as Harper's,
would have to be reviewed under strict scrutiny to survive. Therefore, if
cases on sexual orientation are only due rational basis review it is likely
that the legitimate governmental interest to protect the fundamental right of
speech, moreover religious expressive speech, would be the victor over the
need to protect gay youth from psychological harm in public schools.
B. Ramifications of the Application of the Tinker Standard in Harper
With the new expansion by the Ninth Circuit of the Tinker standard of
"invades the rights of others," many negative viewpoints that are portrayed
in public schools can be censored and silenced as long as such speech
invades the rights of other students in the sense that it may cause them
harm, even psychologically. As such, a case that was settled in 2005 would
have differed from the end result of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Harper.
In Mathewson my previously stated hypothetical was held true. Brad
Mathewson, an openly gay student wore a T-shirt to Webb City High
School with the words, "Gay-Straight Alliance" on the front.10 4 The back
of the T-shirt displayed the words, "Make a Difference," three pairs of
symbols-two male symbols (5J), two female symbols (Y Y), and a male
and female (6y) symbol-and a pink triangle, a well-known symbol of the
gay rights movement.'0 5 On that morning, Mathewson's homeroom
teacher, Ms. Gray, questioned whether Mathewson's T-shirt was
appropriate and sent Mathewson to the office to discuss the T-shirt with
Assistant Principal Jeff Thornsberry. 10 6 Mathewson went to the office and
met with Thornsberry, who told Mathewson the shirt was inappropriate,
103. Id. at 409-10.
104. Complaint at 3, Mathewson v. Webb City R-VII Sch. Dist., (W.D. Mo. filed Apr. 2005).
105. Id.
106. Id.
distracting, and offensive to other students.1"7  When Mathewson
questioned Thornsberry about why the T-shirt was considered
inappropriate, distracting, and offensive to others, Thornsberry refused to
explain his statements.' 0 8  When Mathewson pointed out that other
students' notebooks and backpacks had stickers, signs, markers, or decals
expressing their personal views that gay marriage was wrong, Thornsberry
refused to reconsider and claimed that was a different situation.
10 9
Thornsberry gave Mathewson the option of changing his shirt or turning it
inside out and Mathewson chose the latter option. 10 On the way to the
bathroom to turn his shirt inside out, Mathewson met a friend in the
hallway."1 Mathewson's friend is heterosexual and his friend decided to
switch shirts.1 2 However, Mathewson's friend wore the shirt for the rest of
the day without incident, even though Mathewson had been ordered to
remove it. 113 No teacher and no one in the administration approached
Mathewson's friend about removing the shirt.1 4 A week later Mathewson
wore a T-shirt with a rainbow, a star, and with the words, "I'm gay and I'm
proud," on the front. 15 One of Mathewson's friends wore a T-shirt with
the words, "I love lesbians," on the front." 6 Thornsberry approached
Mathewson and demanded that he change shirts or turn the shirt inside-
out."17 Thornsberry approached Mathewson's friend and demanded that he
change shirts entirely." 8 Mathewson refused to change his shirt or hide its
message, and he left school to go home and call his mother." 9
Thereafter, when Mathewson and his mother pressed for more
information about Mathewson's censored speech, Gollhofer, the school's
principal, said the school was trying to protect Mathewson from other
students who might act out against Mathewson for being gay or his
political positions related to his sexual orientation. 120  Gollhofer
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specifically characterized Webb City High School as being in the middle of
the Bible Belt. 12' Gollhofer further stated that by Mathewson wearing the
aforementioned T-shirts, he was "flaunting" being gay, which could lead to
problems for him.12 2 Gollhofer told Mathewson that if he was allowed to
wear a gay-themed shirt, school officials would have to allow other
students to express anti-gay messages. 123 However, Gollhofer failed to
recognize the fact that several students had anti-gay marriage stickers on
their notebooks that were never told to remove them.' 24 Mathewson asked
if an African-American student would be allowed to wear a T-shirt with the
words, "I'm black and I'm proud," on it. 125 The school officials present at
the meeting told him such a shirt would not be allowed. 26 The question of
whether the school violated Mathewson's First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights for censoring his pro-gay messages was never decided by the federal
district court. 127  Mathewson dropped his lawsuit after months of
negotiation with Webb City High School in which the school finally agreed
that it would no longer illegally censor T-shirts bearing pro-gay
messages.1
28
Although a victory for gay rights in 2005, the facts in Mathewson are
strikingly similar to the facts in Harper, with the only distinction being
what speech the school characterized as negative and positive. To the
Missouri high school in the middle of the Bible Belt the negative speech
was actually advocating for gay rights and homosexuality in general. In
contrast, in Harper, Harper's T-shirt against homosexuality arose in a high
school situated in the liberal state of California. Therefore, under the Ninth
Circuit reading of the "invades the rights of others" prong of the Tinker
standard, censoring Mathewson's speech would also be justified because
such speech would "invade the rights of others," specifically students who
believe that homosexuality is a sin and should not be endorsed in a public
school. Accordingly, it would not be surprising for those advocating anti-
gay messages to use such analysis found in Harper to claim some type of
psychological harm against their Christian values and beliefs that would
121. Id.
122. Complaint at 4, Mathewson, (W.D. Mo. filed Apr. 2005).




127. American Civil Liberties Union of Kansas & Western Missouri, ACLU Secures Promise
from Missouri High School to Stop Censoring Student's Gay-Supportive T-Shirts (June 23, 2005),
http://www.aclukswmo.org/news/tshirt.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2007) [hereinafter ACLU].
128. Id.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
directly affect their learning in some way. Therefore, the ruling in Harper
has dire consequences for promoting any type of speech advocating for any
side on a politically charged issue, including homosexuality, and provides
an arbitrary and vague precedent that will allow public schools across the
country to further their own favored views on certain issues and censor
other views on other issues by deeming them negative based upon their
own school mission and personal values.
III. A New Perspective: Tweaking the Tinker Standard
As I have shown, the expansion of the "invades the rights of others"
prong of the Tinker standard by the Ninth Circuit is wholly problematic
because the standard is overly vague and broad, and is a dangerous conduit
for the suppression of viewpoints depending on one's system of beliefs.
Thus, symbolic speech expressed on a T-shirt, an armband, or any other
piece of clothing or clothing accessory should not be banned under
Harper's erroneous expansion of the "invade the rights of others" prong in
Tinker in the public school setting. More importantly, Harper provides for
the inevitable use of such precedent to censor any positive gay messages
deemed negative by a public school administration, as illustrated in
Mathewson.
Although I assert that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the "invades the
rights of others" prong, I do agree with the Ninth Circuit that because of the
history of oppression that homosexuals have faced in society there needs to
be special consideration that allows gay children the opportunity to a free
and fair education without constant persecution and psychological attack.
Although it has been argued that homosexuals have not been deemed a
suspect class because homosexuals are found to be more educated,
politically active, and economically advantaged, there is a substantial
distinction between confident self-actualized gay adults and impressionable
and politically powerless gay youth. And to quote Justice Stone's most
famous footnote in Carolene Products, "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities.",12 9 As such, although gay and lesbian adults may
somewhat be able to protect themselves from prejudice and hate in public
society, there is a key distinction between gay adults and vulnerable gay
youth who are powerless against the cruelty of their peers. In addition, in
light of such substantial evidence the negative ramifications caused by anti-
gay harassment in public schools, including declined academic
129. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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performance, truancy problems, and high drop out rates.130 As such, rather
than expand the interpretation of the "invades the rights of others"
standard, I instead propose that schools implement hate speech codes
within the public school system to protect sexual minorities from hate
speech that would produce deep psychological harm at a stage in child
development when it is so critical for children to grow and develop without
hateful animus against specific characteristics of their person.
A. Hate Speech Codes
During the 1960s, college campuses were full of violent
demonstrations including protests concerning the Vietnam Conflict and the
denial of civil rights to millions of African Americans.131 Growing out of
the aftermath of the McCarthy-era paranoia, there was a serious
commitment to protecting free expression at the nation's universities. 32 In
the 1980s, there was a "rise in the number of verbal, physical and political
attacks on members of minority groups in the United States."'' 33  As a
result, universities responded to the rise in hate crimes, passing hate speech
codes in order to "achieve... equality for traditionally subordinated groups
in the marketplace of ideas."' 134 The passage of speech codes on college
campuses also paralleled the international community's response to the rise
of hate crimes around the world. 135 Thus, although there has been a strong
commitment to academic freedom at American universities, many college
administrations have implicitly placed the right to equality above the right
to free expression by passing speech codes to protect minority students
from hateful speech. 136 Accordingly:
If a university is a place for knowledge, it is also a special kind of
small society. Yet, it is not primarily a fellowship, a club, a circle of
friends, a replica of the civil society outside it. Without sacrificing its
central purpose [to discover and disseminate knowledge], it cannot make its
130. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2006).
131. Matthew Silversten, Note, What's Next for Wayne Dick? The Next Phase of the Debate
over College Hate Speech Codes, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1247, 1256 (2000).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1256-57 (quoting Jeanne M. Craddock, Constitutional Law-"Words that Injure;
Laws that Silence: " Campus Hate Speech Codes and the Threat to American Education. 22 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 1047, 1050 (1995)).
134. Id. at 1257 (quoting Craddock, supra note 134, at 1048).
135. Id.
136. Id. See Patricia Hodulik, Racist Speech on Campus, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 1433, 1433
(1991) ("The increasing frequency of racist speech and other forms of discriminatory conduct on
college campuses has led many colleges and universities to adopt or to consider adopting student
conduct rules prohibiting such behavior.").
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primary and dominant value the fostering of friendship, solidarity,
harmony, civility or mutual respect .... It may sometimes be necessary in
a university for civility and mutual respect to be superseded by the need to
guarantee free expression .... 137
Similarly, in the K-12 public school system, it is even more necessary
for civility and respect to supersede the need to guarantee student
expression because in these school environments students are more
vulnerable and seemingly powerless to combat against the psychological
harms stemming from hate speech. Thus, a similar ideology as that applied
in the college setting should be applied in K-12 public education to prevent
speech presented in a hateful manner, including Harper's speech asserting
"homosexuality is shameful." In actuality, many commentators have
commonly proposed the justification that hate speech inflicts
psychological, physical, and pecuniary harm on individual victims,
138
which is the same reason the Ninth Circuit asserted to provide for an
expansion of the "invades the rights of others prong." However, hate
speech codes do implicate the First Amendment, and therefore such codes
must be implemented in a manner that can withstand constitutional
scrutiny.139  Even though hate speech codes would implicate the First
Amendment, in the K-12 public education system, free speech rights are
not coextensive as those with the rights of adults in the university
environment. The Court in Tinker explicitly stated that a school may
infringe upon the free exercise of opinion if it materially and substantially
interferes with school discipline or the rights of others. 40  Furthermore,
distinguishing between the educational mission of the university vis-A-vis
K-12 public education provides a strong justification for the
constitutionality of hate speech codes in the K-12 education system. In the
university setting, "free and unfettered interplay of competing views is
essential to the institution's educational mission.'' Whereas in K-12
education, discipline and control is more essential to schools which act in
137. Silversten, supra note 132, at 1249 (quoting The Report of the Committee on Free
Expression at Yale in Yale University Undergraduate Relations, quoted in NAT HENTOFF, FREE
SPEECH FOR ME-BuT NOT FOR THEE 118 (1992).
138. TIMOTHY C. SHIELL, CAMPUS HATE SPEECH ON TRIAL 31-33 (University Press of
Kansas 1998) (discussing Mari Matsuda and Richard Delgado's theories about the negative
effects of hate speech on minorities); see also Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group
Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629, 640 n.50 (1985) (discussing the
psychological trauma residents of Skokie, Illinois, experienced when confronted with the
possibility of having members of the Nazi party walk down their city's streets).
139. Silversten, supra note 134, at 1247.
140. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
141. Silversten, supra note 134, at 1267-68 (quoting Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F.
Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989)).
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loco parentis to protect these children from any potential harms while in
the public school environment. 1
42
Accordingly, public schools should continue to adopt the material and
substantial disruption test of the Tinker standard, and also adopt a
University Mission Model to implement hate speech codes to protect the
right to be secure and let alone of all students. The University Mission
Model adopted by some universities rests upon the Post-Civil War
Amendments-the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments-
because of their guarantees of equal opportunity. 43 "Proponents contend
that hateful speech denies targets of such speech their Fourteenth
Amendment right of equal access to educational facilities and, therefore,
the state has a duty to restrict the majority's ability to use hate speech." 
144
"Proponents of this view believe that universities have a special obligation
to ensure that they provide non-hostile environments for their minority
students.' 45 Similarly, it is central to the educational mission of the public
school system to provide non-hostile environments for sexual minorities to
be able to foster and develop without persecution. "Some scholars argue
that the negative impact of hate speech deprives minorities of the chance to
participate in the academic environment provided by universities to non-
minorities, who are not exposed to hate speech."' 146 However, as applied in
the K-12 public school education system, racial and sexual minorities are in
most instances powerless to combat majority hate speech, particularly in
conservative areas of the country, including the Bible Belt. Yet, at the
same time, hate speech codes should be narrowly tailored to help maintain
a non-hostile environment for minorities while still posing little threat to
the marketplace of ideas. Accordingly, speech that is positive or negative
would be allowed; however speech that is inherently hateful and a direct
attack towards a student's personal characteristics, including race, sex, and
sexual orientation, would be curtailed.
Conclusion
A central theme of all First Amendment jurisprudence is whether the
government regulation under review is an attempt to suppress a message
because of the message or who the messenger is. Essentially there are two
approaches to achieving tolerance concerning freedom of speech in public
142. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).
143. Silversten, supra note 134, at 1260.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Silversten, supra note 134, at 1260.
schools. One is to allow all perspectives to be heard and to teach everyone
to respect different ideas, even if one strongly disagrees with an opposing
view. The second approach is to ban dissenting ideas so that no one feels
challenged or offended, thereby avoiding tension. Some argue that the
latter approach is repugnant to American law. However, although the
government should not set up a debate, take sides, and then ban those with
different beliefs from responding, in the K-12 public education system
minority groups do need protection from hate speech. The truth of the
Ninth Circuit's argument with regards to the psychological well-being of
homosexuals in public schools cannot be ignored. As long ago as Brown v.
Board of Education, the Supreme Court recognized that "[a] sense of
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn." 147  "If a school
permitted its students to wear shirts reading, 'Negroes: Go Back to Africa,'
no one would doubt that the message would be harmful to young black
students."'' 48 As such, public schools should have the power to protect
students such as Mathewson from hate so that it does not result in his
complete alienation from public school and the denial of a fair and full
opportunity to an education. 49  Therefore, although under the Ninth
Circuit's "invades the rights of others" Harper's speech should be allowed
and provided protection under the First Amendment, I propose that to truly
protect equality and provide all students with an equal opportunity to a fair
and just education, narrowly tailored hate speech codes should be
implemented in public school education. As Justice Blackmun prudently
stated in his concurring opinion in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke, "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally,
we must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare not-let the Equal
Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy."' 50 Similarly, here, with
regards to homosexual youth, in order to provide them with an equal and
fair opportunity to fair and full education they must be treated differently to
achieve equality and to abolish the badge of inferiority applied to their
persons because of their sexual orientation.
147. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (internal citation omitted).
148. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006).
149. See ACLU, supra note 128 (discussing Brad Mathewson's alienation and eventual exit
from the Webb City High School because of the anti-gay treatment he faced concerning his pro-
gay fights T-shirt).
150. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun,
concurring).
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